APIs: messaging, media, analytics
Degraded / minor incident SendGrid status
sendgrid.com · Official status page (Statuspage-compatible JSON)
FROM ALL SOURCES
SendGrid's status page shows “Degraded / minor incident” in Voice, Latin America and Voice, APAC; the vendor is monitoring a fix. User reports haven't spiked, so wide impact isn't visible yet. Amazon Web Services, a provider it may run on (inferred), also reports trouble. Coincidence, not causation.
confidence: low Vendor: minor issue · users: normal · routing: no data · upstream providers: major.
- Vendor status page Degraded / minor incident · 4 open incidents
- User reports 0 in 15 min vs ~0 typical
- Routing / BGP no ASN mapped, so no routing view
- News & network weather no recent mentions
- Providers it may run on (inferred) Amazon Web Services: Major outage
- CISA KEV (context) no recent entries for this vendor
Regions mentioned: Voice, Latin America, Voice, APAC, MMS Long Code, North America
| Clock | Started | Running |
|---|---|---|
| Vendor clock when the vendor's open incident started | 18 days | |
| Crowd clock when user reports began rising above normal | not seen | n/a |
| Network clock when routing anomaly data first flagged it | not seen | n/a |
| ORBIT clock when our checker first recorded the change | 1 h 21 min |
Evidence
- Official page: Degraded / minor incident (“Partially Degraded Service”). evidence confidence: high
- Vendor stage: monitoring a fix on “Voice Call Silent and One-Way Audio from Colombia to a Subset of Twilio Phone Numbers”. evidence confidence: high
- User reports are within normal range (0 in 15 min). evidence confidence: low
- Amazon Web Services reports an issue. SendGrid may depend on it (inferred from public sources). Coincidence, not causation. evidence confidence: low
What we don't know: what is happening inside SendGrid's own systems, how many users are actually affected (reports are self-selected and unverified), and anything from routing / bgp. Routing data shows reachability, not whether the app works.
Coincidence, not causation: signals that overlap in time are shown side by side, not as proof of cause.
Automated analysis by Cloudy_Day NetWeather; not a personal statement. Generated .
Cloudy_Day's take
Stage vs. health
The vendor's stage is “monitoring a fix”. Stage tells you where they are in their process; health is what users experience. Right now vendor: minor issue · users: normal · routing: no data · upstream providers: major. Vendor reports an issue we don't see in crowd or routing data (it may be partial or internal).
Who depends on whom
SendGrid may run on Amazon Web Services (inferred). We don't map other services that depend on SendGrid. Dependency chains are where single points of failure hide.
Identity & trust lens
Even without an identity system involved, outages push people toward workarounds: password resets, unofficial apps and “status” links in DMs. Each one is a trust decision. Use official channels.
For users
Check the official status page before changing settings or reinstalling. If you must act, use known-good bookmarks. Reporting what's broken on ORBIT helps everyone see the real footprint.
For security teams
Treat this as an availability event unless an official source says otherwise. Check which of your systems sit on SendGrid or its upstream providers, watch for outage-themed phishing aimed at your users, and log what you see with timestamps (all four clocks).
What to watch next
The vendor stage moving to “monitoring”, then “resolved”; the user-report curve falling back under baseline; and whether dependents start reporting issues.
Automated analysis by Cloudy_Day NetWeather; not a personal statement. Independent researcher; not affiliated with SendGrid. No blame or attack claims without an official source. Generated .