CHYP.ai · ORBIT // Cloudy_Day Security Suite

Databases & data

Operational Supabase status

supabase.com · Official status page (Statuspage-compatible JSON)

FROM ALL SOURCES

Supabase looks fine itself, but Amazon Web Services, a provider it may run on (inferred), reports major outage. Watch for knock-on effects.

confidence: low Vendor: operational · users: normal · routing: no data · upstream providers: major.

Vendor status vs. reality: Vendor status and outside signals roughly agree
The four clocks
ClockStartedRunning
Vendor clock when the vendor's open incident started16 days
Crowd clock when user reports began rising above normalnot seenn/a
Network clock when routing anomaly data first flagged itnot seenn/a
ORBIT clock when our checker first recorded the changenot seenn/a

Evidence

  • Official page: Operational (“All Systems Operational”). evidence confidence: high
  • Vendor stage: resolved on “Storage issues in us-east-1 and eu-central-1”. evidence confidence: high
  • User reports are within normal range (0 in 15 min). evidence confidence: low
  • Amazon Web Services reports an issue. Supabase may depend on it (inferred from public sources). Coincidence, not causation. evidence confidence: low

What we don't know: what is happening inside Supabase's own systems, how many users are actually affected (reports are self-selected and unverified), and anything from routing / bgp. Routing data shows reachability, not whether the app works.

Coincidence, not causation: signals that overlap in time are shown side by side, not as proof of cause.

Automated analysis by Cloudy_Day NetWeather; not a personal statement. Generated .

Cloudy_Day's take

Stage vs. health

The vendor's stage is “resolved”. Stage tells you where they are in their process; health is what users experience. Right now vendor: operational · users: normal · routing: no data · upstream providers: major. Vendor status and outside signals roughly agree.

Who depends on whom

Supabase may run on Amazon Web Services (inferred). We don't map other services that depend on Supabase. Dependency chains are where single points of failure hide.

Identity & trust lens

Even without an identity system involved, outages push people toward workarounds: password resets, unofficial apps and “status” links in DMs. Each one is a trust decision. Use official channels.

For users

Check the official status page before changing settings or reinstalling. If you must act, use known-good bookmarks. Reporting what's broken on ORBIT helps everyone see the real footprint.

For security teams

Treat this as an availability event unless an official source says otherwise. Check which of your systems sit on Supabase or its upstream providers, watch for outage-themed phishing aimed at your users, and log what you see with timestamps (all four clocks).

What to watch next

The vendor stage moving to “monitoring”, then “resolved”; the user-report curve falling back under baseline; and whether dependents start reporting issues.

Automated analysis by Cloudy_Day NetWeather; not a personal statement. Independent researcher; not affiliated with Supabase. No blame or attack claims without an official source. Generated .

INCIDENT REPLAY

Storage issues in us-east-1 and eu-central-1

minor resolved · started · resolved

6 updates

  1. investigating

    We have identified some customers in us-east-1 are experiencing 5XX errors when interacting with our Storage components. We are investigating.

  2. investigating

    We are still investigating increased error rates for storage requests, and have expanded the investigation to eu-central-1 as well. The team has identified higher-than-usual load in some areas of the storage infrastructure and is currently working on remediation options.

  3. monitoring

    The cause of the issue has been identified as directly related to load. We will be doing maintenance on our platform to address this issue. As of now, storage response has returned to normal. We will continue to monitor the environment.

  4. monitoring

    We will be conducting maintenance to address storage service improvements between 0800 and 0900 UTC on 5 November 2026. There may be an interruption of storage services in us-east-1 at some point during that window. The impact will be of a short duration and limited to us-east-1.

  5. monitoring

    The planned database capacity increase for Storage in us-east-1 was completed at 08:06 UTC. Some requests to Storage in us-east-1 may have failed briefly while the database switched over during the change. Storage in us east-1 and eu-central-1 is operating normally. We are continuing to monitor Storage error rates.

  6. resolved

    The incident has been resolved.

Official incident page ↗

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How to read this: official status comes from each provider's own public status page. User reports are unverified visitor reports. Things that happen at the same time are coincidence, not causation. Cloudy_Day is independent and not an official status source for any company listed.

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