Operational Render status
render.com · Official status page (Statuspage-compatible JSON)
FROM ALL SOURCES
Render looks fine itself, but Amazon Web Services, a provider it may run on (inferred), reports major outage. Watch for knock-on effects.
confidence: low Vendor: operational · users: normal · routing: no data · upstream providers: major.
- Vendor status page Operational · 1 open incident
- User reports 0 in 15 min vs ~0 typical
- Routing / BGP no ASN mapped, so no routing view
- News & network weather no recent mentions
- Providers it may run on (inferred) Amazon Web Services: Major outage
- CISA KEV (context) no recent entries for this vendor
Regions mentioned: Builds and Deploys
| Clock | Started | Running |
|---|---|---|
| Vendor clock when the vendor's open incident started | 37 days | |
| Crowd clock when user reports began rising above normal | not seen | n/a |
| Network clock when routing anomaly data first flagged it | not seen | n/a |
| ORBIT clock when our checker first recorded the change | not seen | n/a |
Evidence
- Official page: Operational (“All Systems Operational”). evidence confidence: high
- Vendor stage: postmortem on “Builds, deploys, and queued deploys are not starting in all regions”. evidence confidence: high
- User reports are within normal range (0 in 15 min). evidence confidence: low
- Amazon Web Services reports an issue. Render may depend on it (inferred from public sources). Coincidence, not causation. evidence confidence: low
What we don't know: what is happening inside Render's own systems, how many users are actually affected (reports are self-selected and unverified), and anything from routing / bgp. Routing data shows reachability, not whether the app works.
Coincidence, not causation: signals that overlap in time are shown side by side, not as proof of cause.
Automated analysis by Cloudy_Day NetWeather; not a personal statement. Generated .
Cloudy_Day's take
Stage vs. health
The vendor's stage is “postmortem”. Stage tells you where they are in their process; health is what users experience. Right now vendor: operational · users: normal · routing: no data · upstream providers: major. Vendor status and outside signals roughly agree.
Who depends on whom
Render may run on Amazon Web Services, Google Cloud (inferred). We don't map other services that depend on Render. Dependency chains are where single points of failure hide.
Identity & trust lens
Even without an identity system involved, outages push people toward workarounds: password resets, unofficial apps and “status” links in DMs. Each one is a trust decision. Use official channels.
For users
Check the official status page before changing settings or reinstalling. If you must act, use known-good bookmarks. Reporting what's broken on ORBIT helps everyone see the real footprint.
For security teams
Treat this as an availability event unless an official source says otherwise. Check which of your systems sit on Render or its upstream providers, watch for outage-themed phishing aimed at your users, and log what you see with timestamps (all four clocks).
What to watch next
The vendor stage moving to “monitoring”, then “resolved”; the user-report curve falling back under baseline; and whether dependents start reporting issues.
Automated analysis by Cloudy_Day NetWeather; not a personal statement. Independent researcher; not affiliated with Render. No blame or attack claims without an official source. Generated .
INCIDENT REPLAY
Builds, deploys, and queued deploys are not starting in all regions
major postmortem · started · resolved
10 updates
- investigating
We are currently investigating this issue.
- identified
The issue has been identified and a fix is being implemented.
- monitoring
A fix has been implemented and we are monitoring the results.
- monitoring
We are continuing to monitor for any further issues.
- monitoring
We are temporarily pausing deploys to free services.
- identified
The issue has been identified and a fix is being implemented.
- identified
Builds are failing to start again across all regions, and our team is still working to address the root cause. Deploys for free services remain paused. We'll share another update as soon as we have more information.
- monitoring
A fix has been implemented, and we are monitoring the results. Deploys and builds for services running on free instances continue to be paused.
- resolved
This incident has been resolved.
- postmortem
### Summary On October 14, 2026, between 12:12 and 15:08 PDT \(19:12 - 22:08 UTC\), builds and deploys across all regions failed to start, stalled, or were significantly delayed during two periods of impact totaling about 2 hours and 20 minutes. The cause was a database schema migration run as part of a planned version upgrade of our internal job scheduler that coordinates builds, deploys, and other critical platform operations. The migration led to high load and a longer-than-expected recovery time of this system’s database. We will change how we perform upgrades and modifications of this system in a highly available fashion in the future so that a similar change cannot cause an outage again. ### Impact There were two periods of impact. During this time, live user services were not affected, but builds and deploys across all regions failed to start, failed to finish, or were significant
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How to read this: official status comes from each provider's own public status page. User reports are unverified visitor reports. Things that happen at the same time are coincidence, not causation. Cloudy_Day is independent and not an official status source for any company listed.