Operational GitHub Pages status
pages.github.com · Official status inherited from GitHub
FROM ALL SOURCES
No sign of a widespread GitHub Pages problem right now; every source we read is quiet.
confidence: medium Vendor: operational · users: normal · routing: no data.
- Vendor status page Operational · 1 open incident
- User reports 0 in 15 min vs ~0 typical
- Routing / BGP no ASN mapped, so no routing view
- News & network weather no recent mentions
- Providers it may run on (inferred) status comes from GitHub's page
- CISA KEV (context) no recent entries for this vendor
| Clock | Started | Running |
|---|---|---|
| Vendor clock when the vendor's open incident started | 22 days | |
| Crowd clock when user reports began rising above normal | not seen | n/a |
| Network clock when routing anomaly data first flagged it | not seen | n/a |
| ORBIT clock when our checker first recorded the change | not seen | n/a |
Evidence
- Official page: Operational (“All Systems Operational”). evidence confidence: high
- Vendor stage: resolved on “Disruption with Copilot Cloud services”. evidence confidence: high
- User reports are within normal range (0 in 15 min). evidence confidence: low
What we don't know: what is happening inside GitHub Pages' own systems, how many users are actually affected (reports are self-selected and unverified), and anything from routing / bgp, providers it may run on (inferred). Routing data shows reachability, not whether the app works.
Automated analysis by Cloudy_Day NetWeather; not a personal statement. Generated .
Cloudy_Day's take
Stage vs. health
The vendor's stage is “resolved”. Stage tells you where they are in their process; health is what users experience. Right now vendor: operational · users: normal · routing: no data. Vendor status and outside signals roughly agree.
Who depends on whom
GitHub Pages may run on GitHub (inferred). We don't map other services that depend on GitHub Pages. Dependency chains are where single points of failure hide.
Identity & trust lens
Even without an identity system involved, outages push people toward workarounds: password resets, unofficial apps and “status” links in DMs. Each one is a trust decision. Use official channels.
For users
Nothing points to a broad problem. If it's broken for you, try “Is it just me?” and check your own network first.
For security teams
Treat this as an availability event unless an official source says otherwise. Check which of your systems sit on GitHub Pages or its upstream providers, watch for outage-themed phishing aimed at your users, and log what you see with timestamps (all four clocks).
What to watch next
Any new vendor incident, a jump in user reports above baseline, or trouble at the providers GitHub Pages may depend on.
Automated analysis by Cloudy_Day NetWeather; not a personal statement. Independent researcher; not affiliated with GitHub Pages. No blame or attack claims without an official source. Generated .
INCIDENT REPLAY
Disruption with Copilot Cloud services
minor resolved · started · resolved
6 updates
- investigating
We are investigating reports of impacted performance for some GitHub services.
- investigating
We are experiencing increased failures and latency on our agent sessions service, including creating and listing sessions. This can impact cloud based agent sessions on web, mobile, VS Code, CLI and the GitHub Copilot app.
- investigating
We continue to experience failure rates of 1-2% and increased latency on our agent sessions service, including creating and listing sessions. This can impact cloud based agent sessions on web, mobile, VS Code, CLI and the GitHub Copilot app.
- investigating
We continue to experience failure rates of 1-2% and increased latency on our agent sessions service, including creating and listing sessions. This can impact cloud based agent sessions on web, mobile, VS Code, CLI and the GitHub Copilot app. We are actively applying mitigations and monitoring for recovery.
- monitoring
The degradation has been mitigated. We are monitoring to ensure stability.
- resolved
On October 29, 2026, between 05:50 UTC and 12:40 UTC, Copilot agent sessions on GitHub.com and in VS Code were degraded. Live session updates often failed to load, and on average 2.14% of requests to the agent sessions service failed, with a peak of 8.61%. For about 10 minutes around 09:20 UTC, up to 40% of requests to list or create agent sessions failed. Copilot Chat on GitHub.com showed degraded agent session features during this time. The issue occurred when a large increase in task-list requests from a client experiment overloaded the cache that supports the agent sessions service. We mitigated the impact by increasing cache capacity, reducing nonessential load on the cache, and disabling the client experiment. We are moving rate limiting to separate infrastructure, reducing client polling, and improving our alerting so we can detect and respond to this type of overload faster.
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How to read this: official status comes from each provider's own public status page. User reports are unverified visitor reports. Things that happen at the same time are coincidence, not causation. Cloudy_Day is independent and not an official status source for any company listed.