Operational GitHub Pages status
pages.github.com · Official status inherited from GitHub
FROM ALL SOURCES
No sign of a widespread GitHub Pages problem right now; every source we read is quiet.
confidence: medium Vendor: operational · users: normal · routing: no data.
- Vendor status page Operational · 1 open incident
- User reports 0 in 15 min vs ~0 typical
- Routing / BGP no ASN mapped, so no routing view
- News & network weather no recent mentions
- Providers it may run on (inferred) status comes from GitHub's page
- CISA KEV (context) no recent entries for this vendor
Regions mentioned: API Requests
| Clock | Started | Running |
|---|---|---|
| Vendor clock when the vendor's open incident started | 12 days | |
| Crowd clock when user reports began rising above normal | not seen | n/a |
| Network clock when routing anomaly data first flagged it | not seen | n/a |
| ORBIT clock when our checker first recorded the change | not seen | n/a |
Evidence
- Official page: Operational (“All Systems Operational”). evidence confidence: high
- Vendor stage: resolved on “Increase in timeouts for some unauthenticated users”. evidence confidence: high
- User reports are within normal range (0 in 15 min). evidence confidence: low
What we don't know: what is happening inside GitHub Pages' own systems, how many users are actually affected (reports are self-selected and unverified), and anything from routing / bgp, providers it may run on (inferred). Routing data shows reachability, not whether the app works.
Automated analysis by Cloudy_Day NetWeather; not a personal statement. Generated .
Cloudy_Day's take
Stage vs. health
The vendor's stage is “resolved”. Stage tells you where they are in their process; health is what users experience. Right now vendor: operational · users: normal · routing: no data. Vendor status and outside signals roughly agree.
Who depends on whom
GitHub Pages may run on GitHub (inferred). We don't map other services that depend on GitHub Pages. Dependency chains are where single points of failure hide.
Identity & trust lens
Even without an identity system involved, outages push people toward workarounds: password resets, unofficial apps and “status” links in DMs. Each one is a trust decision. Use official channels.
For users
Nothing points to a broad problem. If it's broken for you, try “Is it just me?” and check your own network first.
For security teams
Treat this as an availability event unless an official source says otherwise. Check which of your systems sit on GitHub Pages or its upstream providers, watch for outage-themed phishing aimed at your users, and log what you see with timestamps (all four clocks).
What to watch next
Any new vendor incident, a jump in user reports above baseline, or trouble at the providers GitHub Pages may depend on.
Automated analysis by Cloudy_Day NetWeather; not a personal statement. Independent researcher; not affiliated with GitHub Pages. No blame or attack claims without an official source. Generated .
INCIDENT REPLAY
Increase in timeouts for some unauthenticated users
minor resolved · started · resolved
7 updates
- investigating
We are investigating reports of impacted performance for some GitHub services.
- investigating
We are continuing to investigate degraded performance primarily for unauthenticated users.
- investigating
API Requests is experiencing degraded performance. We are continuing to investigate.
- investigating
We've identified a problematic component and are working to redeploy it.
- investigating
The degradation affecting API Requests has been mitigated. We are monitoring to ensure stability.
- monitoring
The degradation has been mitigated. We are monitoring to ensure stability.
- resolved
On November 8, 2026, between 08:43 and 12:29 UTC, unauthenticated requests to github.com and the GitHub REST API experienced elevated error rates. During this period, 11.3% of unauthenticated requests and 46.1% of release asset download requests failed. Authenticated requests were largely unaffected.<br /><br />Initial errors occurred in a backend service handling unauthenticated web traffic. A subsequent traffic spike caused high CPU utilization on servers in our caching layer. Some servers remained unhealthy after the spike ended, prolonging the disruption. We restored service by restarting caching software and rebooting affected servers.<br /><br />We are improving monitoring to detect these failures sooner, investigating why affected servers did not recover automatically, and reviewing caching behavior to better protect backend services during failures.
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How to read this: official status comes from each provider's own public status page. User reports are unverified visitor reports. Things that happen at the same time are coincidence, not causation. Cloudy_Day is independent and not an official status source for any company listed.