Operational GitHub Pages status
pages.github.com · Official status inherited from GitHub
FROM ALL SOURCES
No sign of a widespread GitHub Pages problem right now; every source we read is quiet.
confidence: medium Vendor: operational · users: normal · routing: no data.
- Vendor status page Operational · 1 open incident
- User reports 0 in 15 min vs ~0 typical
- Routing / BGP no ASN mapped, so no routing view
- News & network weather no recent mentions
- Providers it may run on (inferred) status comes from GitHub's page
- CISA KEV (context) no recent entries for this vendor
Regions mentioned: Pull Requests, Actions
| Clock | Started | Running |
|---|---|---|
| Vendor clock when the vendor's open incident started | 10 days | |
| Crowd clock when user reports began rising above normal | not seen | n/a |
| Network clock when routing anomaly data first flagged it | not seen | n/a |
| ORBIT clock when our checker first recorded the change | not seen | n/a |
Evidence
- Official page: Operational (“All Systems Operational”). evidence confidence: high
- Vendor stage: resolved on “Incident with Git Operations and Pull Requests”. evidence confidence: high
- User reports are within normal range (0 in 15 min). evidence confidence: low
What we don't know: what is happening inside GitHub Pages' own systems, how many users are actually affected (reports are self-selected and unverified), and anything from routing / bgp, providers it may run on (inferred). Routing data shows reachability, not whether the app works.
Automated analysis by Cloudy_Day NetWeather; not a personal statement. Generated .
Cloudy_Day's take
Stage vs. health
The vendor's stage is “resolved”. Stage tells you where they are in their process; health is what users experience. Right now vendor: operational · users: normal · routing: no data. Vendor status and outside signals roughly agree.
Who depends on whom
GitHub Pages may run on GitHub (inferred). We don't map other services that depend on GitHub Pages. Dependency chains are where single points of failure hide.
Identity & trust lens
Even without an identity system involved, outages push people toward workarounds: password resets, unofficial apps and “status” links in DMs. Each one is a trust decision. Use official channels.
For users
Nothing points to a broad problem. If it's broken for you, try “Is it just me?” and check your own network first.
For security teams
Treat this as an availability event unless an official source says otherwise. Check which of your systems sit on GitHub Pages or its upstream providers, watch for outage-themed phishing aimed at your users, and log what you see with timestamps (all four clocks).
What to watch next
Any new vendor incident, a jump in user reports above baseline, or trouble at the providers GitHub Pages may depend on.
Automated analysis by Cloudy_Day NetWeather; not a personal statement. Independent researcher; not affiliated with GitHub Pages. No blame or attack claims without an official source. Generated .
INCIDENT REPLAY
Incident with Git Operations and Pull Requests
critical resolved · started · resolved
9 updates
- investigating
We are investigating reports of degraded performance for Actions and Pull Requests
- investigating
Actions and Pull Requests are experiencing degraded availability. We are continuing to investigate.
- investigating
We're investigating elevated response times for Git operations and pull requests. GitHub Actions workflows that are triggered from Pull Requests are delayed. We're working to mitigate the impact and will share updates as we learn more.
- investigating
Actions is experiencing degraded availability. We are continuing to investigate.
- investigating
We continue to investigate elevated response times for Git operations and pull requests. Some pull-request processing and Actions workflows are improving, but delays and failures persist. We're monitoring the impact and working to restore normal service.
- investigating
Pull Requests is experiencing degraded performance. We are continuing to investigate.
- investigating
Actions is operating normally.
- investigating
We continue to investigate elevated response times for Git operations and pull requests. Actions workflows are recovering. Pull request processing has shown some improvement, but users continue to experience delays and failures. We’re monitoring the impact and working to restore normal service.
- resolved
On November 10, 2026, from approximately 15:00 UTC to 17:55 UTC, GitHub experienced degraded performance affecting repository pages, pull requests, and GitHub Actions. Customers may have seen slow or failed page loads and delays processing pull request updates and merges. Some pull requests continued to display an earlier source-branch commit after the broader service degradation ended. GitHub Actions workflows were delayed for approximately 1.8% of events, peaking at about 7% between 16:30 and 16:50 UTC. Delays were typically 1.5 to 3.5 minutes, up to 10 minutes. Approximately 0.09% of pull request events did not start their workflows and needed to be re-triggered. <br /><br />The degradation resulted from overload in the shared infrastructure that supports Git operations. Recent changes increased background processing and the work required to compute pull request merges, adding pressur
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How to read this: official status comes from each provider's own public status page. User reports are unverified visitor reports. Things that happen at the same time are coincidence, not causation. Cloudy_Day is independent and not an official status source for any company listed.