Operational GitHub Pages status
pages.github.com · Official status inherited from GitHub
FROM ALL SOURCES
No sign of a widespread GitHub Pages problem right now; every source we read is quiet.
confidence: medium Vendor: operational · users: normal · routing: no data.
- Vendor status page Operational · 1 open incident
- User reports 0 in 15 min vs ~0 typical
- Routing / BGP no ASN mapped, so no routing view
- News & network weather no recent mentions
- Providers it may run on (inferred) status comes from GitHub's page
- CISA KEV (context) no recent entries for this vendor
Regions mentioned: Git Operations
| Clock | Started | Running |
|---|---|---|
| Vendor clock when the vendor's open incident started | 17 days | |
| Crowd clock when user reports began rising above normal | not seen | n/a |
| Network clock when routing anomaly data first flagged it | not seen | n/a |
| ORBIT clock when our checker first recorded the change | not seen | n/a |
Evidence
- Official page: Operational (“All Systems Operational”). evidence confidence: high
- Vendor stage: resolved on “Incident with Git Operations”. evidence confidence: high
- User reports are within normal range (0 in 15 min). evidence confidence: low
What we don't know: what is happening inside GitHub Pages' own systems, how many users are actually affected (reports are self-selected and unverified), and anything from routing / bgp, providers it may run on (inferred). Routing data shows reachability, not whether the app works.
Automated analysis by Cloudy_Day NetWeather; not a personal statement. Generated .
Cloudy_Day's take
Stage vs. health
The vendor's stage is “resolved”. Stage tells you where they are in their process; health is what users experience. Right now vendor: operational · users: normal · routing: no data. Vendor status and outside signals roughly agree.
Who depends on whom
GitHub Pages may run on GitHub (inferred). We don't map other services that depend on GitHub Pages. Dependency chains are where single points of failure hide.
Identity & trust lens
Even without an identity system involved, outages push people toward workarounds: password resets, unofficial apps and “status” links in DMs. Each one is a trust decision. Use official channels.
For users
Nothing points to a broad problem. If it's broken for you, try “Is it just me?” and check your own network first.
For security teams
Treat this as an availability event unless an official source says otherwise. Check which of your systems sit on GitHub Pages or its upstream providers, watch for outage-themed phishing aimed at your users, and log what you see with timestamps (all four clocks).
What to watch next
Any new vendor incident, a jump in user reports above baseline, or trouble at the providers GitHub Pages may depend on.
Automated analysis by Cloudy_Day NetWeather; not a personal statement. Independent researcher; not affiliated with GitHub Pages. No blame or attack claims without an official source. Generated .
INCIDENT REPLAY
Incident with Git Operations
minor resolved · started · resolved
6 updates
- investigating
We are investigating reports of degraded performance for Git Operations
- investigating
We have identified the issue impacting Git Operations and are beginning to roll out a mitigation. We will follow up with another update when we begin to see recovery.
- investigating
Our mitigation is rolled out and customers should start seeing improvements to Git Operations. We will continue to provide updates on mitigation status.
- investigating
We are seeing significant improvement, though some Git Operations may be slow for a small set of customers. We are marking this as mitigated and will continue to monitor.
- monitoring
The degradation affecting Git Operations has been mitigated. We are monitoring to ensure stability.
- resolved
On November 3, 2026, between 15:00 UTC and 22:37 UTC, Git operations over HTTPS on GitHub.com were degraded. Clones, fetches, and pushes over HTTPS were slow, and some failed. For about half of Git HTTPS traffic, median response time rose from under 100 milliseconds to as high as 5 seconds. On average, the error rate was 0.65% and peaked at 1.29% of requests to the service. Git operations over SSH were not affected. <br /><br />This was due to a buildup of excess connections on the hosts that serve Git HTTPS traffic, which saturated their network capacity and caused slow and failed responses for all clients served by those hosts. <br /><br />We mitigated the incident by blocking a client traffic pattern at our load balancers and reloading them, which released the excess connections. The block also prevented some users of one third-party integration from performing Git operations over HTT
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How to read this: official status comes from each provider's own public status page. User reports are unverified visitor reports. Things that happen at the same time are coincidence, not causation. Cloudy_Day is independent and not an official status source for any company listed.