Operational OVHcloud status
ovhcloud.com · Official status page (Statuspage-compatible JSON)
FROM ALL SOURCES
No sign of a widespread OVHcloud problem right now; every source we read is quiet.
confidence: medium Vendor: operational · users: normal · routing: no data.
- Vendor status page Operational · 2 open incidents
- User reports 0 in 15 min vs ~0 typical
- Routing / BGP AS16276: routing data not loaded on this view
- News & network weather no recent mentions
- Providers it may run on (inferred) no mapped dependencies
- CISA KEV (context) no recent entries for this vendor
Regions mentioned: RBX-A, BHS, DE
| Clock | Started | Running |
|---|---|---|
| Vendor clock when the vendor's open incident started | 235 days | |
| Crowd clock when user reports began rising above normal | not seen | n/a |
| Network clock when routing anomaly data first flagged it | not seen | n/a |
| ORBIT clock when our checker first recorded the change | not seen | n/a |
Evidence
- Official page: Operational (“All Systems Operational”). evidence confidence: high
- Vendor stage: resolved on “[RBX-A][Public Cloud] Block Storage incident notification”. evidence confidence: high
- User reports are within normal range (0 in 15 min). evidence confidence: low
What we don't know: what is happening inside OVHcloud's own systems, how many users are actually affected (reports are self-selected and unverified), and anything from routing / bgp, providers it may run on (inferred). Routing data shows reachability, not whether the app works.
Automated analysis by Cloudy_Day NetWeather; not a personal statement. Generated .
Cloudy_Day's take
Stage vs. health
The vendor's stage is “resolved”. Stage tells you where they are in their process; health is what users experience. Right now vendor: operational · users: normal · routing: no data. Vendor status and outside signals roughly agree.
Who depends on whom
We don't map other services that depend on OVHcloud. Dependency chains are where single points of failure hide.
Identity & trust lens
Even without an identity system involved, outages push people toward workarounds: password resets, unofficial apps and “status” links in DMs. Each one is a trust decision. Use official channels.
For users
Nothing points to a broad problem. If it's broken for you, try “Is it just me?” and check your own network first.
For security teams
Treat this as an availability event unless an official source says otherwise. Check which of your systems sit on OVHcloud, watch for outage-themed phishing aimed at your users, and log what you see with timestamps (all four clocks).
What to watch next
Any new vendor incident, a jump in user reports above baseline, or trouble at the providers OVHcloud may depend on.
Automated analysis by Cloudy_Day NetWeather; not a personal statement. Independent researcher; not affiliated with OVHcloud. No blame or attack claims without an official source. Generated .
INCIDENT REPLAY
[RBX-A][Public Cloud] Block Storage incident notification
minor resolved · started · resolved
2 updates
- identified
We are currently experiencing an incident affecting our Block Storage offering in the RBX-A region. Please find the details of this incident below : <b>Start time :</b> 20/10/2026 08:48 UTC <b>Impacted Service(s) :</b> Block Storage volumes hosted on the RBX-A were unavailable between 08:48 and 09:00 UTC and are currently experiencing reduced performance. <b>Customers Impact :</b> Customers were temporarily unable to access their Block Storage volumes between 08:48 and 09:00 UTC. Since 09:00 UTC, customers may experience degraded performance on their volumes while the cluster is recovering. <b>Root Cause :</b> This incident is caused by a hardware issue. <b>Ongoing Actions :</b> Our teams are actively working to restore full performance as quickly as possible. We will keep you updated on the progress and resolution. We apologize for any inconvenience caused and appreciate your understand
- resolved
We would like to inform you that the incident affecting our Public Cloud offering has now been resolved. Please find the details of this incident below : <b>Start time :</b> 20/10/2026 08:48 UTC <b>End time :</b> 20/10/2026 10:26 UTC <b>Impacted Service(s) :</b> Block Storage volumes hosted on the PCI-RBX-A-volumes_2 cluster in the RBX-A region were unavailable between 08:48 and 09:00 UTC, followed by reduced performance until 10:26 UTC. <b>Customers Impact :</b> Customers were temporarily unable to access their Block Storage volumes between 08:48 and 09:00 UTC, and may have experienced degraded performance on their volumes until 10:26 UTC while the cluster was recovering. <b>Root Cause :</b> This incident was caused by a hardware issue. We thank you for your understanding and patience throughout this incident.
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How to read this: official status comes from each provider's own public status page. User reports are unverified visitor reports. Things that happen at the same time are coincidence, not causation. Cloudy_Day is independent and not an official status source for any company listed.