CHYP.ai · ORBIT // Cloudy_Day Security Suite

Monitoring & on-call

Operational Opsgenie status

atlassian.com · Official status page (Statuspage-compatible JSON)

FROM ALL SOURCES

Opsgenie looks fine itself, but Amazon Web Services, a provider it may run on (inferred), reports major outage. Watch for knock-on effects.

confidence: low Vendor: operational · users: normal · routing: no data · upstream providers: major.

Vendor status vs. reality: Vendor status and outside signals roughly agree

Regions mentioned: Web Application, Mobile Application

The four clocks
ClockStartedRunning
Vendor clock when the vendor's open incident started67 days
Crowd clock when user reports began rising above normalnot seenn/a
Network clock when routing anomaly data first flagged itnot seenn/a
ORBIT clock when our checker first recorded the changenot seenn/a

Evidence

  • Official page: Operational (“All Systems Operational”). evidence confidence: high
  • Vendor stage: postmortem on “Disrupted Opsgenie/JSM availability”. evidence confidence: high
  • User reports are within normal range (0 in 15 min). evidence confidence: low
  • Amazon Web Services reports an issue. Opsgenie may depend on it (inferred from public sources). Coincidence, not causation. evidence confidence: low

What we don't know: what is happening inside Opsgenie's own systems, how many users are actually affected (reports are self-selected and unverified), and anything from routing / bgp. Routing data shows reachability, not whether the app works.

Coincidence, not causation: signals that overlap in time are shown side by side, not as proof of cause.

Automated analysis by Cloudy_Day NetWeather; not a personal statement. Generated .

Cloudy_Day's take

Stage vs. health

The vendor's stage is “postmortem”. Stage tells you where they are in their process; health is what users experience. Right now vendor: operational · users: normal · routing: no data · upstream providers: major. Vendor status and outside signals roughly agree.

Who depends on whom

Opsgenie may run on Amazon Web Services (inferred). We don't map other services that depend on Opsgenie. Dependency chains are where single points of failure hide.

Identity & trust lens

Even without an identity system involved, outages push people toward workarounds: password resets, unofficial apps and “status” links in DMs. Each one is a trust decision. Use official channels.

For users

Check the official status page before changing settings or reinstalling. If you must act, use known-good bookmarks. Reporting what's broken on ORBIT helps everyone see the real footprint.

For security teams

Treat this as an availability event unless an official source says otherwise. Check which of your systems sit on Opsgenie or its upstream providers, watch for outage-themed phishing aimed at your users, and log what you see with timestamps (all four clocks).

What to watch next

The vendor stage moving to “monitoring”, then “resolved”; the user-report curve falling back under baseline; and whether dependents start reporting issues.

Automated analysis by Cloudy_Day NetWeather; not a personal statement. Independent researcher; not affiliated with Opsgenie. No blame or attack claims without an official source. Generated .

INCIDENT REPLAY

Disrupted Opsgenie/JSM availability

critical postmortem · started · resolved

5 updates

  1. investigating

    We are actively investigating reports of a service disruption affecting Opsgenie and Jira Service Management. We will share updates here as more information is available.

  2. identified

    We have identified the likely cause of the issue, and our teams are diligently working on a mitigation. We will continue to share additional updates here as more information is available.

  3. monitoring

    The issue has now been resolved, and services are operating normally for all affected customers. We will continue to monitor closely to confirm stability.

  4. resolved

    On September 14, 2026, Opsgenie and Jira Service Management experienced a disruption, and impacted users saw delayed alerts notification and inability to view the alerts in the user interface. The issue has now been resolved, and the service is operating normally for all affected customers.

  5. postmortem

    ### Summary On September 14, 2026, between 15:30 and 17:10 UTC, Atlassian customers using Opsgenie, Jira Service Management, and Compass experienced delays in receiving alert notifications and intermittent failures when using Ops features. The issue was triggered by long-running transactions in a core service, which led to thread pool exhaustion and caused subsequent requests to become unresponsive. The long-running transactions were caused by a configuration change released between September 9, 2026 and September 11, 2026 UTC. The team actively monitored the impact of the change on the system until early September 14, 2026 UTC, and observed no anomalies. However, increasing traffic during US working hours on September 14, 2026, caused these unexpectedly long-running transactions. The incident was detected within one minute by our automated monitoring systems, and full service stabilizat

Official incident page ↗

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How to read this: official status comes from each provider's own public status page. User reports are unverified visitor reports. Things that happen at the same time are coincidence, not causation. Cloudy_Day is independent and not an official status source for any company listed.

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