APIs: messaging, media, analytics
Operational Bird (MessageBird) status
bird.com · Official status page (Statuspage-compatible JSON)
FROM ALL SOURCES
No sign of a widespread Bird (MessageBird) problem right now; every source we read is quiet.
confidence: medium Vendor: operational · users: normal · routing: no data.
- Vendor status page Operational · 1 open incident
- User reports 0 in 15 min vs ~0 typical
- Routing / BGP no ASN mapped, so no routing view
- News & network weather no recent mentions
- Providers it may run on (inferred) no mapped dependencies
- CISA KEV (context) no recent entries for this vendor
Regions mentioned: Bird Platform
| Clock | Started | Running |
|---|---|---|
| Vendor clock when the vendor's open incident started | 3 days | |
| Crowd clock when user reports began rising above normal | not seen | n/a |
| Network clock when routing anomaly data first flagged it | not seen | n/a |
| ORBIT clock when our checker first recorded the change | not seen | n/a |
Evidence
- Official page: Operational (“All Systems Operational”). evidence confidence: high
- Vendor stage: postmortem on “Invalid "user not found" bounces from Apple iCloud / Private Relay addresses”. evidence confidence: high
- User reports are within normal range (0 in 15 min). evidence confidence: low
What we don't know: what is happening inside Bird (MessageBird)'s own systems, how many users are actually affected (reports are self-selected and unverified), and anything from routing / bgp, providers it may run on (inferred). Routing data shows reachability, not whether the app works.
Automated analysis by Cloudy_Day NetWeather; not a personal statement. Generated .
Cloudy_Day's take
Stage vs. health
The vendor's stage is “postmortem”. Stage tells you where they are in their process; health is what users experience. Right now vendor: operational · users: normal · routing: no data. Vendor status and outside signals roughly agree.
Who depends on whom
We don't map other services that depend on Bird (MessageBird). Dependency chains are where single points of failure hide.
Identity & trust lens
Even without an identity system involved, outages push people toward workarounds: password resets, unofficial apps and “status” links in DMs. Each one is a trust decision. Use official channels.
For users
Nothing points to a broad problem. If it's broken for you, try “Is it just me?” and check your own network first.
For security teams
Treat this as an availability event unless an official source says otherwise. Check which of your systems sit on Bird (MessageBird), watch for outage-themed phishing aimed at your users, and log what you see with timestamps (all four clocks).
What to watch next
Any new vendor incident, a jump in user reports above baseline, or trouble at the providers Bird (MessageBird) may depend on.
Automated analysis by Cloudy_Day NetWeather; not a personal statement. Independent researcher; not affiliated with Bird (MessageBird). No blame or attack claims without an official source. Generated .
INCIDENT REPLAY
Invalid "user not found" bounces from Apple iCloud / Private Relay addresses
minor postmortem · started · resolved
4 updates
- identified
We have confirmed that this morning's "user not found" bounces for Apple Private Relay (privaterelay.appleid.com) addresses were caused by an issue on Apple's side, and that the affected addresses are valid. Apple has returned these errors in several waves today. Volume is well below its peak, but some are still occurring. We have begun removing the suppressions created by these bounces. Because of the number of addresses involved, we expect the cleanup to take several hours. Any additional addresses suppressed by this issue will be included in the cleanup. No action is needed from you. We will post another update when the cleanup is complete.
- identified
We are continuing to work on a fix for this issue.
- resolved
We have finished removing the suppressions created by today's incorrect "user not found" bounces from Apple Private Relay (privaterelay.appleid.com). The affected addresses can receive email again. We have also made a change so that if Apple returns these errors again, the addresses will not be added to your suppression list. No action is needed from you. This incident is resolved.
- postmortem
If you maintain your own suppression list Our cleanup removed these entries from SparkPost's suppression list. If you also keep your own list, you may need to remove affected addresses there too. Which addresses depend on how you build your list: * If you copy suppressions from SparkPost \(Suppression List API or export\): remove entries with source "Bounce Rule" for recipients at [privaterelay.appleid.com](http://privaterelay.appleid.com) that were created on November 17 between 13:00 and 21:05 UTC \(8:00 AM–4:05 PM ET\). For EU accounts, the end of the window is 21:16 UTC \(4:16 PM ET\). From those times on, SparkPost no longer added these addresses to its suppression list. * If you suppress addresses based on bounce events \(webhooks or Events API\): look for bounce events to [privaterelay.appleid.com](http://privaterelay.appleid.com) with bounce class 10 and the response "550 5.1.1 <
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How to read this: official status comes from each provider's own public status page. User reports are unverified visitor reports. Things that happen at the same time are coincidence, not causation. Cloudy_Day is independent and not an official status source for any company listed.