CHYP.ai · ORBIT // Cloudy_Day Security Suite

Developer tools

Operational GitHub status

github.com · Official status page (Statuspage-compatible JSON)

FROM ALL SOURCES

No sign of a widespread GitHub problem right now; every source we read is quiet.

confidence: medium Vendor: operational · users: normal · routing: no data.

Vendor status vs. reality: Vendor status and outside signals roughly agree

Regions mentioned: Webhooks, Actions

The four clocks
ClockStartedRunning
Vendor clock when the vendor's open incident started11 days
Crowd clock when user reports began rising above normalnot seenn/a
Network clock when routing anomaly data first flagged itnot seenn/a
ORBIT clock when our checker first recorded the changenot seenn/a

Evidence

  • Official page: Operational (“All Systems Operational”). evidence confidence: high
  • Vendor stage: resolved on “Incident with Webhooks and Actions”. evidence confidence: high
  • User reports are within normal range (0 in 15 min). evidence confidence: low

What we don't know: what is happening inside GitHub's own systems, how many users are actually affected (reports are self-selected and unverified), and anything from routing / bgp. Routing data shows reachability, not whether the app works.

Automated analysis by Cloudy_Day NetWeather; not a personal statement. Generated .

Cloudy_Day's take

Stage vs. health

The vendor's stage is “resolved”. Stage tells you where they are in their process; health is what users experience. Right now vendor: operational · users: normal · routing: no data. Vendor status and outside signals roughly agree.

Who depends on whom

GitHub may run on Microsoft Azure (inferred). 2 other services in our catalog may lean on GitHub, so trouble here can show up elsewhere first. Dependency chains are where single points of failure hide.

Identity & trust lens

Even without an identity system involved, outages push people toward workarounds: password resets, unofficial apps and “status” links in DMs. Each one is a trust decision. Use official channels.

For users

Nothing points to a broad problem. If it's broken for you, try “Is it just me?” and check your own network first.

For security teams

Treat this as an availability event unless an official source says otherwise. Check which of your systems sit on GitHub or its upstream providers, watch for outage-themed phishing aimed at your users, and log what you see with timestamps (all four clocks).

What to watch next

Any new vendor incident, a jump in user reports above baseline, or trouble at the providers GitHub may depend on.

Automated analysis by Cloudy_Day NetWeather; not a personal statement. Independent researcher; not affiliated with GitHub. No blame or attack claims without an official source. Generated .

INCIDENT REPLAY

Incident with Webhooks and Actions

major resolved · started · resolved

8 updates

  1. investigating

    We are investigating reports of degraded performance for Actions and Webhooks

  2. investigating

    We're investigating delays in Actions runs start times and webhook deliveries.

  3. investigating

    We've applied a mitigation and are monitoring for recovery.

  4. investigating

    The degradation affecting Actions has been mitigated. We are monitoring to ensure stability.

  5. investigating

    Webhooks is experiencing degraded availability. We are continuing to investigate.

  6. investigating

    Webhooks is experiencing degraded performance. We are continuing to investigate.

  7. monitoring

    The degradation affecting Webhooks has been mitigated. We are monitoring to ensure stability.

  8. resolved

    On November 9, 2026, from 09:23 to 11:40 UTC, one of our job queue clusters was degraded, delaying webhook deliveries, Actions workflow runs, and Dependabot and dependency graph updates. Until mitigation at 10:37 UTC, an average of 26% of webhook deliveries were delayed, peaking at 30%, and the backlog cleared by 11:40 UTC. Some deliveries were delayed by up to 3.5 hours, and delays for a small share began as early as 01:00 UTC. Actions skips events older than 30 minutes, so some workflow runs did not start. <br /><br />The incident was caused by a degraded host that had slowed one of the cluster's Kafka brokers since November 7. The broker stopped reporting the metrics our alerts rely on, so we did not identify it until it stalled the cluster on November 9. <br /><br />We mitigated the incident by removing the broker from service. We have since added an alert that pages us within 30 min

Official incident page ↗

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How to read this: official status comes from each provider's own public status page. User reports are unverified visitor reports. Things that happen at the same time are coincidence, not causation. Cloudy_Day is independent and not an official status source for any company listed.

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