CHYP.ai · ORBIT // Cloudy_Day Security Suite

Developer tools

Operational GitHub status

github.com · Official status page (Statuspage-compatible JSON)

FROM ALL SOURCES

No sign of a widespread GitHub problem right now; every source we read is quiet.

confidence: medium Vendor: operational · users: normal · routing: no data.

Vendor status vs. reality: Vendor status and outside signals roughly agree

Regions mentioned: API Requests, Issues, Pull Requests

The four clocks
ClockStartedRunning
Vendor clock when the vendor's open incident started25 days
Crowd clock when user reports began rising above normalnot seenn/a
Network clock when routing anomaly data first flagged itnot seenn/a
ORBIT clock when our checker first recorded the changenot seenn/a

Evidence

  • Official page: Operational (“All Systems Operational”). evidence confidence: high
  • Vendor stage: resolved on “Incident with Actions, Issues, API Requests and Pull Requests”. evidence confidence: high
  • User reports are within normal range (0 in 15 min). evidence confidence: low

What we don't know: what is happening inside GitHub's own systems, how many users are actually affected (reports are self-selected and unverified), and anything from routing / bgp. Routing data shows reachability, not whether the app works.

Automated analysis by Cloudy_Day NetWeather; not a personal statement. Generated .

Cloudy_Day's take

Stage vs. health

The vendor's stage is “resolved”. Stage tells you where they are in their process; health is what users experience. Right now vendor: operational · users: normal · routing: no data. Vendor status and outside signals roughly agree.

Who depends on whom

GitHub may run on Microsoft Azure (inferred). 2 other services in our catalog may lean on GitHub, so trouble here can show up elsewhere first. Dependency chains are where single points of failure hide.

Identity & trust lens

Even without an identity system involved, outages push people toward workarounds: password resets, unofficial apps and “status” links in DMs. Each one is a trust decision. Use official channels.

For users

Nothing points to a broad problem. If it's broken for you, try “Is it just me?” and check your own network first.

For security teams

Treat this as an availability event unless an official source says otherwise. Check which of your systems sit on GitHub or its upstream providers, watch for outage-themed phishing aimed at your users, and log what you see with timestamps (all four clocks).

What to watch next

Any new vendor incident, a jump in user reports above baseline, or trouble at the providers GitHub may depend on.

Automated analysis by Cloudy_Day NetWeather; not a personal statement. Independent researcher; not affiliated with GitHub. No blame or attack claims without an official source. Generated .

INCIDENT REPLAY

Incident with Actions, Issues, API Requests and Pull Requests

minor resolved · started · resolved

4 updates

  1. investigating

    We are investigating reports of degraded performance for API Requests, Actions, Issues and Pull Requests

  2. monitoring

    The degradation has been mitigated. We are monitoring to ensure stability.

  3. monitoring

    We saw elevated latency affecting REST API requests, including Checks, and some Actions, Issues, Pull Requests, and GraphQL functionality. Some requests may have been slow or timed out, and notifications were delayed from 17:59 UTC - 18:40 UTC.<br /><br />We mitigated the issue and all services have recovered.

  4. resolved

    On October 26, 2026, between 17:52 and 18:49 UTC, some customers experienced slower response times across the Checks API, Issues, Pull Requests, GraphQL, Notifications, and related services. Impact was limited to requests served from one of our datacenter sites. Some GraphQL requests failed, and some notifications were delayed. Among GraphQL requests served from the affected site, the average error rate was 5.68%, with a peak five-minute error rate of 14.32%. <br /><br />Unusually large requests for contribution history overwhelmed part of our database infrastructure, causing a backlog. Requests continued reaching the slow component rather than being redirected to healthy systems. Restarting the component restored its performance. The incident was marked mitigated at 18:46 UTC and resolved at 18:57 UTC. <br /><br />We are adding limits to these requests, improving alerts to detect overlo

Official incident page ↗

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How to read this: official status comes from each provider's own public status page. User reports are unverified visitor reports. Things that happen at the same time are coincidence, not causation. Cloudy_Day is independent and not an official status source for any company listed.

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