Degraded / minor incident Fivetran status
fivetran.com · Official status page (Statuspage-compatible JSON)
FROM ALL SOURCES
Fivetran's status page shows “Degraded / minor incident” in General Services and Stripe; the vendor is resolved. User reports haven't spiked, so wide impact isn't visible yet.
confidence: low Vendor: minor issue · users: normal · routing: no data.
- Vendor status page Degraded / minor incident · 2 open incidents
- User reports 0 in 15 min vs ~0 typical
- Routing / BGP no ASN mapped, so no routing view
- News & network weather no recent mentions
- Providers it may run on (inferred) no mapped dependencies
- CISA KEV (context) no recent entries for this vendor
Regions mentioned: General Services, Stripe, Stripe test mode
| Clock | Started | Running |
|---|---|---|
| Vendor clock when the vendor's open incident started | 21 days | |
| Crowd clock when user reports began rising above normal | not seen | n/a |
| Network clock when routing anomaly data first flagged it | not seen | n/a |
| ORBIT clock when our checker first recorded the change | 1 h 17 min |
Evidence
- Official page: Degraded / minor incident (“Minor Service Outage”). evidence confidence: high
- Vendor stage: resolved on “3rd Party: Syncs Delayed Across Multiple Connections and Transformations”. evidence confidence: high
- User reports are within normal range (0 in 15 min). evidence confidence: low
What we don't know: what is happening inside Fivetran's own systems, how many users are actually affected (reports are self-selected and unverified), and anything from routing / bgp, providers it may run on (inferred). Routing data shows reachability, not whether the app works.
Automated analysis by Cloudy_Day NetWeather; not a personal statement. Generated .
Cloudy_Day's take
Stage vs. health
The vendor's stage is “resolved”. Stage tells you where they are in their process; health is what users experience. Right now vendor: minor issue · users: normal · routing: no data. Vendor reports an issue we don't see in crowd or routing data (it may be partial or internal).
Who depends on whom
We don't map other services that depend on Fivetran. Dependency chains are where single points of failure hide.
Identity & trust lens
Even without an identity system involved, outages push people toward workarounds: password resets, unofficial apps and “status” links in DMs. Each one is a trust decision. Use official channels.
For users
Check the official status page before changing settings or reinstalling. If you must act, use known-good bookmarks. Reporting what's broken on ORBIT helps everyone see the real footprint.
For security teams
Treat this as an availability event unless an official source says otherwise. Check which of your systems sit on Fivetran, watch for outage-themed phishing aimed at your users, and log what you see with timestamps (all four clocks).
What to watch next
The vendor stage moving to “monitoring”, then “resolved”; the user-report curve falling back under baseline; and whether dependents start reporting issues.
Automated analysis by Cloudy_Day NetWeather; not a personal statement. Independent researcher; not affiliated with Fivetran. No blame or attack claims without an official source. Generated .
INCIDENT REPLAY
3rd Party: Syncs Delayed Across Multiple Connections and Transformations
minor resolved · started · resolved
4 updates
- identified
The issue has been identified and we are working to resolve it. Next Expected Update: 1 hour
- identified
We have identified an issue where syncs for multiple connections were delayed due to intermittent request failures affecting a subset of Temporal namespaces in GCP us-east4. Temporal has implemented a fix, and we are monitoring the results. Temporal status page: https://status.temporal.io/incidents/w54m5gbn5dc4 Next Expected Update: 1 hour
- monitoring
We see that the connection syncs are recovering now Next Expected Update: 3 hours
- resolved
This incident has been resolved. We have observed that instance rates are returning to normal levels and affected connectors are syncing successfully. Description: Multiple connection syncs and transformations runs were not triggered due to an incident affecting Temporal. Timeline: This issue began on October 31, 2026, at 11:20 AM UTC and was resolved on October 31, 2026, at 1:45 PM UTC. Cause: Intermittent request failures affecting a subset of Temporal namespaces in GCP us-east4 disrupted sync and transformation triggering. Temporal incident details: https://status.temporal.io/incidents/w54m5gbn5dc4. Resolution: Temporal fixed the issue, after which connection syncs and transformations runs were resumed.
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How to read this: official status comes from each provider's own public status page. User reports are unverified visitor reports. Things that happen at the same time are coincidence, not causation. Cloudy_Day is independent and not an official status source for any company listed.