CHYP.ai · ORBIT // Cloudy_Day Security Suite

AI services

Operational GitHub Copilot status

github.com · Official status inherited from GitHub

FROM ALL SOURCES

No sign of a widespread GitHub Copilot problem right now; every source we read is quiet.

confidence: medium Vendor: operational · users: normal · routing: no data.

Vendor status vs. reality: Vendor status and outside signals roughly agree

Regions mentioned: Webhooks, Actions, Pages

The four clocks
ClockStartedRunning
Vendor clock when the vendor's open incident started32 days
Crowd clock when user reports began rising above normalnot seenn/a
Network clock when routing anomaly data first flagged itnot seenn/a
ORBIT clock when our checker first recorded the changenot seenn/a

Evidence

  • Official page: Operational (“All Systems Operational”). evidence confidence: high
  • Vendor stage: resolved on “Degraded availability for GitHub Actions, GitHub Pages and Webhooks”. evidence confidence: high
  • User reports are within normal range (0 in 15 min). evidence confidence: low

What we don't know: what is happening inside GitHub Copilot's own systems, how many users are actually affected (reports are self-selected and unverified), and anything from routing / bgp. Routing data shows reachability, not whether the app works.

Automated analysis by Cloudy_Day NetWeather; not a personal statement. Generated .

Cloudy_Day's take

Stage vs. health

The vendor's stage is “resolved”. Stage tells you where they are in their process; health is what users experience. Right now vendor: operational · users: normal · routing: no data. Vendor status and outside signals roughly agree.

Who depends on whom

GitHub Copilot may run on GitHub, Microsoft Azure (inferred). We don't map other services that depend on GitHub Copilot. Dependency chains are where single points of failure hide.

Identity & trust lens

Even without an identity system involved, outages push people toward workarounds: password resets, unofficial apps and “status” links in DMs. Each one is a trust decision. Use official channels.

For users

Nothing points to a broad problem. If it's broken for you, try “Is it just me?” and check your own network first.

For security teams

Treat this as an availability event unless an official source says otherwise. Check which of your systems sit on GitHub Copilot or its upstream providers, watch for outage-themed phishing aimed at your users, and log what you see with timestamps (all four clocks).

What to watch next

Any new vendor incident, a jump in user reports above baseline, or trouble at the providers GitHub Copilot may depend on.

Automated analysis by Cloudy_Day NetWeather; not a personal statement. Independent researcher; not affiliated with GitHub Copilot. No blame or attack claims without an official source. Generated .

INCIDENT REPLAY

Degraded availability for GitHub Actions, GitHub Pages and Webhooks

critical resolved · started · resolved

6 updates

  1. investigating

    We are investigating reports of degraded performance for Actions and Pages

  2. investigating

    Webhooks is experiencing degraded performance. We are continuing to investigate.

  3. investigating

    We’re are currently investigating degraded availability affecting GitHub Actions, GitHub Pages and Webhooks. <br /><br />Customers may experience delays in workflow processing, site builds and webhook delivery.<br />

  4. investigating

    We’re seeing recovery following mitigation and are continuing to monitor. <br /><br />Customers may still experience delays in GitHub Actions workflow status updates, GitHub Pages deployments, and check and workflow webhook events generated by Actions runs.

  5. monitoring

    Actions, Pages and Webhooks are operating normally.

  6. resolved

    On October 19, 2026, between 15:24 and 16:52 UTC, GitHub Actions, GitHub Pages, and webhooks generated by Actions were degraded. Live updates on GitHub.com and code search were also degraded for part of this time. No data was lost. <br /><br />Impact <br /><br /> - Workflow status updates, logs, and checks were delayed. <br /> - 5.13% of jobs on GitHub-hosted runners were delayed in starting, and 0.02% of workflow runs failed. <br /> - During the first 30 minutes, 8.47% of requests to the Actions jobs REST API returned errors. <br /><br />Pages deployments and webhooks generated by Actions runs were delayed. <br /><br />An internal Actions service that stores logs and run status lost connections to some of its cache servers in one cloud region and immediately retried them from every server at once. The resulting surge of new connections overloaded a shared network link between our data c

Official incident page ↗

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How to read this: official status comes from each provider's own public status page. User reports are unverified visitor reports. Things that happen at the same time are coincidence, not causation. Cloudy_Day is independent and not an official status source for any company listed.

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