Operational CircleCI status
circleci.com · Official status page (Statuspage-compatible JSON)
FROM ALL SOURCES
CircleCI looks fine itself, but Amazon Web Services, a provider it may run on (inferred), reports major outage. Watch for knock-on effects.
confidence: low Vendor: operational · users: normal · routing: no data · upstream providers: major.
- Vendor status page Operational · 1 open incident
- User reports 0 in 15 min vs ~0 typical
- Routing / BGP no ASN mapped, so no routing view
- News & network weather no recent mentions
- Providers it may run on (inferred) Amazon Web Services: Major outage
- CISA KEV (context) no recent entries for this vendor
Regions mentioned: Docker Jobs
| Clock | Started | Running |
|---|---|---|
| Vendor clock when the vendor's open incident started | 23 days | |
| Crowd clock when user reports began rising above normal | not seen | n/a |
| Network clock when routing anomaly data first flagged it | not seen | n/a |
| ORBIT clock when our checker first recorded the change | not seen | n/a |
Evidence
- Official page: Operational (“All Systems Operational”). evidence confidence: high
- Vendor stage: postmortem on “Delays for gen2 dedicated IP range jobs”. evidence confidence: high
- User reports are within normal range (0 in 15 min). evidence confidence: low
- Amazon Web Services reports an issue. CircleCI may depend on it (inferred from public sources). Coincidence, not causation. evidence confidence: low
What we don't know: what is happening inside CircleCI's own systems, how many users are actually affected (reports are self-selected and unverified), and anything from routing / bgp. Routing data shows reachability, not whether the app works.
Coincidence, not causation: signals that overlap in time are shown side by side, not as proof of cause.
Automated analysis by Cloudy_Day NetWeather; not a personal statement. Generated .
Cloudy_Day's take
Stage vs. health
The vendor's stage is “postmortem”. Stage tells you where they are in their process; health is what users experience. Right now vendor: operational · users: normal · routing: no data · upstream providers: major. Vendor status and outside signals roughly agree.
Who depends on whom
CircleCI may run on Amazon Web Services, Google Cloud (inferred). We don't map other services that depend on CircleCI. Dependency chains are where single points of failure hide.
Identity & trust lens
Even without an identity system involved, outages push people toward workarounds: password resets, unofficial apps and “status” links in DMs. Each one is a trust decision. Use official channels.
For users
Check the official status page before changing settings or reinstalling. If you must act, use known-good bookmarks. Reporting what's broken on ORBIT helps everyone see the real footprint.
For security teams
Treat this as an availability event unless an official source says otherwise. Check which of your systems sit on CircleCI or its upstream providers, watch for outage-themed phishing aimed at your users, and log what you see with timestamps (all four clocks).
What to watch next
The vendor stage moving to “monitoring”, then “resolved”; the user-report curve falling back under baseline; and whether dependents start reporting issues.
Automated analysis by Cloudy_Day NetWeather; not a personal statement. Independent researcher; not affiliated with CircleCI. No blame or attack claims without an official source. Generated .
INCIDENT REPLAY
Delays for gen2 dedicated IP range jobs
minor postmortem · started · resolved
5 updates
- investigating
We are investigating delays in starting docker gen2 jobs that use dedicated IP ranges. Jobs are currently delayed by about 10 minutes. No other resource classes are impacted at this time. We will continue to provide updates as more information is available.
- identified
We’ve identified the cause as limited compute availability from our cloud provider, and we are working to free up additional capacity for these jobs to restore normal start times. We'll provide another update again shortly.
- monitoring
We are starting to see signs of recovery now, wait times are starting to return to normal. We're keeping an eye on this and we'll update again soon.
- resolved
Wait times for gen2 dedicated IP range jobs have fully returned to normal. We appreciate your patience while worked through this issue.
- postmortem
## **Summary** From 14:20 to 19:08 UTC on October 28, customers running Gen 2 Docker jobs using IP Ranges saw increased wait times for their jobs to start. From 14:20 until 17:02, the delays were intermittent, and from 17:02 to 18:50, the delays were continuous. No other job types were affected. The incident was caused by limited availability of the cloud instances we had configured for the IP Ranges cluster. In response, our engineering team added additional fallback instance types to the IP Ranges cluster and transferred capacity from one of our other Gen 2 clusters to the IP Ranges cluster. By 18:50, wait times had improved, and by 19:08 they had fully recovered. After we resolved the incident, we increased the number of baseline cloud instances we maintain for IP Ranges jobs. We have also configured an IP Ranges cluster in an additional cloud region. The original status page can be f
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How to read this: official status comes from each provider's own public status page. User reports are unverified visitor reports. Things that happen at the same time are coincidence, not causation. Cloudy_Day is independent and not an official status source for any company listed.