CHYP.ai · ORBIT // Cloudy_Day Security Suite

CDN & edge

Maintenance bunny.net status

bunny.net · Official status page (Statuspage-compatible JSON)

FROM ALL SOURCES

bunny.net's status page shows “Maintenance” in CDN and API; the vendor is resolved. User reports haven't spiked, so wide impact isn't visible yet.

confidence: low Vendor: minor issue · users: normal · routing: no data.

Vendor status vs. reality: Vendor reports an issue we don't see in crowd or routing data (it may be partial or internal)

Regions mentioned: CDN, API, Edge Storage

The four clocks
ClockStartedRunning
Vendor clock when the vendor's open incident started23 days
Crowd clock when user reports began rising above normalnot seenn/a
Network clock when routing anomaly data first flagged itnot seenn/a
ORBIT clock when our checker first recorded the change1 h 31 min

Evidence

  • Official page: Maintenance (“Service Under Maintenance”). evidence confidence: high
  • Vendor stage: resolved on “Security update regarding one of our infrastructure providers”. evidence confidence: high
  • User reports are within normal range (0 in 15 min). evidence confidence: low

What we don't know: what is happening inside bunny.net's own systems, how many users are actually affected (reports are self-selected and unverified), and anything from routing / bgp, providers it may run on (inferred). Routing data shows reachability, not whether the app works.

Automated analysis by Cloudy_Day NetWeather; not a personal statement. Generated .

Cloudy_Day's take

Stage vs. health

The vendor's stage is “resolved”. Stage tells you where they are in their process; health is what users experience. Right now vendor: minor issue · users: normal · routing: no data. Vendor reports an issue we don't see in crowd or routing data (it may be partial or internal).

Who depends on whom

We don't map other services that depend on bunny.net. Dependency chains are where single points of failure hide.

Identity & trust lens

Even without an identity system involved, outages push people toward workarounds: password resets, unofficial apps and “status” links in DMs. Each one is a trust decision. Use official channels.

For users

Check the official status page before changing settings or reinstalling. If you must act, use known-good bookmarks. Reporting what's broken on ORBIT helps everyone see the real footprint.

For security teams

Treat this as an availability event unless an official source says otherwise. Check which of your systems sit on bunny.net, watch for outage-themed phishing aimed at your users, and log what you see with timestamps (all four clocks).

What to watch next

The vendor stage moving to “monitoring”, then “resolved”; the user-report curve falling back under baseline; and whether dependents start reporting issues.

Automated analysis by Cloudy_Day NetWeather; not a personal statement. Independent researcher; not affiliated with bunny.net. No blame or attack claims without an official source. Generated .

INCIDENT REPLAY

Security update regarding one of our infrastructure providers

none resolved · started · resolved

5 updates

  1. monitoring

    We're reaching out to inform you of a security incident involving one of our infrastructure providers, the steps we've taken, and what this means for you. - What happened and how we responded Last week, one of our infrastructure providers reported unauthorized access involving third-party server management software. One of our CDN nodes, located in Armenia, was hosted on a server supplied by this provider. After receiving the alert from the affected provider, our engineering team took immediate action. Within 20 minutes, we stopped routing traffic through the server. We then reviewed and preserved the relevant security logs for investigation, securely wiped the server, and revoked its access to our other systems. The affected server has been permanently removed from our infrastructure. Our investigation found no evidence of unauthorized access to the CDN node or any of its data. The infr

  2. monitoring

    We're providing an update on the reissuance of managed TLS certificates for custom domains. Reissuance is ongoing and progressing steadily. To avoid any disruption to the delivery of your content, certificates are being reissued gradually in controlled batches, and each reissued certificate uses a new private key. This is taking longer than our initial estimate, and we now expect the process to be completed by the end of October 31. Your existing certificates continue to be served without interruption until they are replaced, and no action is required from customers using managed certificates. If you manage your own TLS certificates, we continue to recommend revoking and reissuing them with new private keys as a precaution. Neither our investigation nor the provider's ongoing investigation has found any new evidence of unauthorized access to our server. We'll post a further update on our

  3. monitoring

    We've completed the reissuance of managed TLS certificates for custom domains. All managed certificates have been reissued with new private keys, and the previous certificates have been revoked. No action is required from customers using managed certificates. If you manage your own TLS certificates and haven't done so yet, we continue to recommend revoking and reissuing them with new private keys as a precaution. - What we're doing to prevent this in the future We have stopped using the affected provider while their investigation continues. We recognise that we can't rely on any single layer of security, so we're taking additional steps to reduce the potential impact of similar incidents that could occur in the future. We're reducing what each server holds: we're changing how configurations are distributed so that each PoP only receives the configuration and TLS certificates for the site

  4. monitoring

    We can confirm that the revocation of all affected certificates is now complete. Let's Encrypt has published every revocation in its Certificate Revocation Lists (CRLs). Every Let's Encrypt certificate that was on the affected server has been revoked with the reason "key compromise". Browsers and clients that check revocation will now reject the old certificates. The replacement certificates now in use are not affected, and customers don't need to do anything. Our provider's investigation is still ongoing. We will continue to follow up and will share the final outcome once it is complete.

  5. resolved

    All remediation work on our side is complete. Every certificate we manage through Let's Encrypt for the affected hostnames has been reissued, and the previous certificates have been revoked and published in Let's Encrypt's Certificate Revocation Lists (CRLs). If you uploaded your own custom certificate: as mentioned in our earlier updates, please make sure you have replaced it with a new certificate and private key, and asked your certificate authority to revoke the old one. We can't do this for you. Until you do, the old certificate and its private key should be treated as compromised. We are closing this incident because no further action is required on our side. Our provider's investigation into the root cause is still ongoing. When we receive their final report, we will email affected customers directly with a summary of the findings. Thank you for your patience while we worked throu

Official incident page ↗

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How to read this: official status comes from each provider's own public status page. User reports are unverified visitor reports. Things that happen at the same time are coincidence, not causation. Cloudy_Day is independent and not an official status source for any company listed.

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