Operational Buildkite status
buildkite.com · Official status page (Statuspage-compatible JSON)
FROM ALL SOURCES
Buildkite looks fine itself, but Amazon Web Services, a provider it may run on (inferred), reports major outage. Watch for knock-on effects.
confidence: low Vendor: operational · users: normal · routing: no data · upstream providers: major.
- Vendor status page Operational · 1 open incident
- User reports 0 in 15 min vs ~0 typical
- Routing / BGP no ASN mapped, so no routing view
- News & network weather no recent mentions
- Providers it may run on (inferred) Amazon Web Services: Major outage
- CISA KEV (context) no recent entries for this vendor
| Clock | Started | Running |
|---|---|---|
| Vendor clock when the vendor's open incident started | 59 days | |
| Crowd clock when user reports began rising above normal | not seen | n/a |
| Network clock when routing anomaly data first flagged it | not seen | n/a |
| ORBIT clock when our checker first recorded the change | not seen | n/a |
Evidence
- Official page: Operational (“All Systems Operational”). evidence confidence: high
- Vendor stage: postmortem on “Issues with webhook ingestion, GraphQL queries”. evidence confidence: high
- User reports are within normal range (0 in 15 min). evidence confidence: low
- Amazon Web Services reports an issue. Buildkite may depend on it (inferred from public sources). Coincidence, not causation. evidence confidence: low
What we don't know: what is happening inside Buildkite's own systems, how many users are actually affected (reports are self-selected and unverified), and anything from routing / bgp. Routing data shows reachability, not whether the app works.
Coincidence, not causation: signals that overlap in time are shown side by side, not as proof of cause.
Automated analysis by Cloudy_Day NetWeather; not a personal statement. Generated .
Cloudy_Day's take
Stage vs. health
The vendor's stage is “postmortem”. Stage tells you where they are in their process; health is what users experience. Right now vendor: operational · users: normal · routing: no data · upstream providers: major. Vendor status and outside signals roughly agree.
Who depends on whom
Buildkite may run on Amazon Web Services (inferred). We don't map other services that depend on Buildkite. Dependency chains are where single points of failure hide.
Identity & trust lens
Even without an identity system involved, outages push people toward workarounds: password resets, unofficial apps and “status” links in DMs. Each one is a trust decision. Use official channels.
For users
Check the official status page before changing settings or reinstalling. If you must act, use known-good bookmarks. Reporting what's broken on ORBIT helps everyone see the real footprint.
For security teams
Treat this as an availability event unless an official source says otherwise. Check which of your systems sit on Buildkite or its upstream providers, watch for outage-themed phishing aimed at your users, and log what you see with timestamps (all four clocks).
What to watch next
The vendor stage moving to “monitoring”, then “resolved”; the user-report curve falling back under baseline; and whether dependents start reporting issues.
Automated analysis by Cloudy_Day NetWeather; not a personal statement. Independent researcher; not affiliated with Buildkite. No blame or attack claims without an official source. Generated .
INCIDENT REPLAY
Issues with webhook ingestion, GraphQL queries
major postmortem · started · resolved
4 updates
- investigating
We're seeing an issue affecting webhook ingestion and execution of GraphQL queries and are investigating the cause.
- identified
Our engineers have addressed the issue and we're monitoring recovery.
- resolved
Services are fully recovered. Webhook ingestion was affected between 19:09 UTC - 19:32 UTC.
- postmortem
## Service Impact On September 22, 2026, between 19:09 and 19:32 UTC, customers experienced failures ingesting webhooks and executing GraphQL queries. Some web application requests also failed or timed out. During this period, 2.0% of requests to our webhook ingestion endpoints and 20.3% of requests to our external GraphQL endpoint returned HTTP 500 errors. Webhook ingestion errors ceased by 19:30 UTC, and external GraphQL errors returned to background levels by 19:32 UTC. ## Incident Summary While investigating a separate API performance issue, we made a manual configuration change intended to rollback a routing change for one database proxy. The command instead changed the routing configuration for another database proxy, disrupting access to a database shard used internally by Buildkite. Some customer-facing operations search across all database shards to locate their shard, where rou
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How to read this: official status comes from each provider's own public status page. User reports are unverified visitor reports. Things that happen at the same time are coincidence, not causation. Cloudy_Day is independent and not an official status source for any company listed.