Operational Buildkite status
buildkite.com · Official status page (Statuspage-compatible JSON)
FROM ALL SOURCES
Buildkite looks fine itself, but Amazon Web Services, a provider it may run on (inferred), reports major outage. Watch for knock-on effects.
confidence: low Vendor: operational · users: normal · routing: no data · upstream providers: major.
- Vendor status page Operational · 1 open incident
- User reports 0 in 15 min vs ~0 typical
- Routing / BGP no ASN mapped, so no routing view
- News & network weather no recent mentions
- Providers it may run on (inferred) Amazon Web Services: Major outage
- CISA KEV (context) no recent entries for this vendor
| Clock | Started | Running |
|---|---|---|
| Vendor clock when the vendor's open incident started | 31 days | |
| Crowd clock when user reports began rising above normal | not seen | n/a |
| Network clock when routing anomaly data first flagged it | not seen | n/a |
| ORBIT clock when our checker first recorded the change | not seen | n/a |
Evidence
- Official page: Operational (“All Systems Operational”). evidence confidence: high
- Vendor stage: resolved on “Buildkite response to the eMudhra certificate compromise”. evidence confidence: high
- User reports are within normal range (0 in 15 min). evidence confidence: low
- Amazon Web Services reports an issue. Buildkite may depend on it (inferred from public sources). Coincidence, not causation. evidence confidence: low
What we don't know: what is happening inside Buildkite's own systems, how many users are actually affected (reports are self-selected and unverified), and anything from routing / bgp. Routing data shows reachability, not whether the app works.
Coincidence, not causation: signals that overlap in time are shown side by side, not as proof of cause.
Automated analysis by Cloudy_Day NetWeather; not a personal statement. Generated .
Cloudy_Day's take
Stage vs. health
The vendor's stage is “resolved”. Stage tells you where they are in their process; health is what users experience. Right now vendor: operational · users: normal · routing: no data · upstream providers: major. Vendor status and outside signals roughly agree.
Who depends on whom
Buildkite may run on Amazon Web Services (inferred). We don't map other services that depend on Buildkite. Dependency chains are where single points of failure hide.
Identity & trust lens
Even without an identity system involved, outages push people toward workarounds: password resets, unofficial apps and “status” links in DMs. Each one is a trust decision. Use official channels.
For users
Check the official status page before changing settings or reinstalling. If you must act, use known-good bookmarks. Reporting what's broken on ORBIT helps everyone see the real footprint.
For security teams
Treat this as an availability event unless an official source says otherwise. Check which of your systems sit on Buildkite or its upstream providers, watch for outage-themed phishing aimed at your users, and log what you see with timestamps (all four clocks).
What to watch next
The vendor stage moving to “monitoring”, then “resolved”; the user-report curve falling back under baseline; and whether dependents start reporting issues.
Automated analysis by Cloudy_Day NetWeather; not a personal statement. Independent researcher; not affiliated with Buildkite. No blame or attack claims without an official source. Generated .
INCIDENT REPLAY
Buildkite response to the eMudhra certificate compromise
none resolved · started · resolved
4 updates
- investigating
The private keys for eight certificates issued by eMudhra, an external certificate authority, have been compromised. Software that still trusts these certificates may accept fraudulent HTTPS certificates. We’re updating the services that power Buildkite and preparing new CLI and Agent releases, which we expect to ship shortly. We’re also tracking fixes to the libraries and trust stores we depend on and will apply them as they become available. We’ll update this page with the new versions and any action customers need to take. Mozilla has published background on the compromise.
- monitoring
We're continuing to monitor the situation, and are making releases to many of our components that run in customer infrastructure. At time of writing, we've released versions that distrust the affected eMudhra certificates for: - Buildkite agent: https://github.com/buildkite/agent: - v4.7.0: https://github.com/buildkite/agent/releases/tag/v4.7.0 - v3.138.2: https://github.com/buildkite/agent/releases/tag/v3.138.2 - Buildkite CLI: https://github.com/buildkite/cli/releases/tag/v3.64.2 - bktec: https://github.com/buildkite/test-engine-client/releases/tag/v3.3.1 We recommend updating to these versions to prevent exposure to the affected certificate providers. We will continue to issue updates for the other binaries we distribute, and are updating any internal services that are affected.
- monitoring
We’ve finished updating the services that power Buildkite so they no longer trust the affected eMudhra certificates. No action is needed from customers for Buildkite hosted services. For components that run in customer infrastructure, we still recommend upgrading to the releases listed in our previous update (Buildkite agent v4.7.0 / v3.138.2, Buildkite CLI v3.64.2, and bktec v3.3.1). We’re continuing to release updates for the other binaries we distribute and will post them here as they ship.
- resolved
All services that power Buildkite have been updated to distrust the affected certificates, and updated releases are available for the components we distribute that run in customer infrastructure: Buildkite agent: v4.7.0 and v3.138.2 Buildkite CLI: v3.64.2 bktec: v3.3.1 elastic-ci-stack-for-aws: v7.8.0 agent-stack-k8s: v0.52.0 We recommend updating to these versions to prevent exposure to the affected certificate providers.
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How to read this: official status comes from each provider's own public status page. User reports are unverified visitor reports. Things that happen at the same time are coincidence, not causation. Cloudy_Day is independent and not an official status source for any company listed.