CHYP.ai · ORBIT // Cloudy_Day Security Suite

Developer tools

Operational Buildkite status

buildkite.com · Official status page (Statuspage-compatible JSON)

FROM ALL SOURCES

Buildkite looks fine itself, but Amazon Web Services, a provider it may run on (inferred), reports major outage. Watch for knock-on effects.

confidence: low Vendor: operational · users: normal · routing: no data · upstream providers: major.

Vendor status vs. reality: Vendor status and outside signals roughly agree

Regions mentioned: REST API, Web, Agent API

The four clocks
ClockStartedRunning
Vendor clock when the vendor's open incident started72 days
Crowd clock when user reports began rising above normalnot seenn/a
Network clock when routing anomaly data first flagged itnot seenn/a
ORBIT clock when our checker first recorded the changenot seenn/a

Evidence

  • Official page: Operational (“All Systems Operational”). evidence confidence: high
  • Vendor stage: postmortem on “Buildkite service disruption”. evidence confidence: high
  • User reports are within normal range (0 in 15 min). evidence confidence: low
  • Amazon Web Services reports an issue. Buildkite may depend on it (inferred from public sources). Coincidence, not causation. evidence confidence: low

What we don't know: what is happening inside Buildkite's own systems, how many users are actually affected (reports are self-selected and unverified), and anything from routing / bgp. Routing data shows reachability, not whether the app works.

Coincidence, not causation: signals that overlap in time are shown side by side, not as proof of cause.

Automated analysis by Cloudy_Day NetWeather; not a personal statement. Generated .

Cloudy_Day's take

Stage vs. health

The vendor's stage is “postmortem”. Stage tells you where they are in their process; health is what users experience. Right now vendor: operational · users: normal · routing: no data · upstream providers: major. Vendor status and outside signals roughly agree.

Who depends on whom

Buildkite may run on Amazon Web Services (inferred). We don't map other services that depend on Buildkite. Dependency chains are where single points of failure hide.

Identity & trust lens

Even without an identity system involved, outages push people toward workarounds: password resets, unofficial apps and “status” links in DMs. Each one is a trust decision. Use official channels.

For users

Check the official status page before changing settings or reinstalling. If you must act, use known-good bookmarks. Reporting what's broken on ORBIT helps everyone see the real footprint.

For security teams

Treat this as an availability event unless an official source says otherwise. Check which of your systems sit on Buildkite or its upstream providers, watch for outage-themed phishing aimed at your users, and log what you see with timestamps (all four clocks).

What to watch next

The vendor stage moving to “monitoring”, then “resolved”; the user-report curve falling back under baseline; and whether dependents start reporting issues.

Automated analysis by Cloudy_Day NetWeather; not a personal statement. Independent researcher; not affiliated with Buildkite. No blame or attack claims without an official source. Generated .

INCIDENT REPLAY

Buildkite service disruption

major postmortem · started · resolved

6 updates

  1. investigating

    We've spotted that something has gone wrong. We're currently investigating the issue, and will provide an update soon.

  2. investigating

    We are continuing to investigate this issue. We are seeing impact on the Agent API which will affect job scheduling, artifact uploads, and an increase in 5xx responses from the Agent API endpoints.

  3. investigating

    We are continuing to investigate elevated error rates across multiple services, and are working to determine the cause.

  4. monitoring

    We are seeing improvements across the affected services, and are seeing services return to normal functionality. We are continuing to monitor and are determining the root cause.

  5. resolved

    We have seen full recovery for customers since 20:28 UTC. We experienced an autoscaling feedback loop which increased the number of connections to our redis cluster above its ability to respond. This had widespread impact for all of our customers with Web UI, Agent API, REST API and job queue impact between 18:43-19:21 UTC, and again between 20:02-20:28 UTC. A full post incident review will be available later this week.

  6. postmortem

    ## Service Impact _All times UTC unless stated otherwise._ Customers experienced elevated errors and latency across the Buildkite web interface, REST API, Agent API, and job queue during two periods: 18:43:00–19:21:00 and 20:02:00–20:28:00 on September 9, 2026. During these periods, customers encountered failed API requests, delayed job dispatch, and errors in agent operations including authentication, job acceptance, and artifact uploads. Some jobs impacted by the incident did not recover automatically. These jobs had to be manually cancelled and retried to complete successfully. Between 18:43:00–19:21:00: Agent API had an error rate up to 11.2% with no latency impact. REST API had a 9.7% error rate with no latency impact. Web request had a 2.6% error rate with no latency impact. Job queues were delayed by up to 3 minutes. Between 20:02:00–20:28:00: Agent API had an error rate up to 24.

Official incident page ↗

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How to read this: official status comes from each provider's own public status page. User reports are unverified visitor reports. Things that happen at the same time are coincidence, not causation. Cloudy_Day is independent and not an official status source for any company listed.

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