Operational Asana status
asana.com · Official status page (Statuspage-compatible JSON)
FROM ALL SOURCES
Asana looks fine itself, but Amazon Web Services, a provider it may run on (inferred), reports major outage. Watch for knock-on effects.
confidence: low Vendor: operational · users: normal · routing: no data · upstream providers: major.
- Vendor status page Operational · 1 open incident
- User reports 0 in 15 min vs ~0 typical
- Routing / BGP no ASN mapped, so no routing view
- News & network weather no recent mentions
- Providers it may run on (inferred) Amazon Web Services: Major outage
- CISA KEV (context) no recent entries for this vendor
Regions mentioned: App, API, Mobile
| Clock | Started | Running |
|---|---|---|
| Vendor clock when the vendor's open incident started | 81 days | |
| Crowd clock when user reports began rising above normal | not seen | n/a |
| Network clock when routing anomaly data first flagged it | not seen | n/a |
| ORBIT clock when our checker first recorded the change | not seen | n/a |
Evidence
- Official page: Operational (“All Systems Operational”). evidence confidence: high
- Vendor stage: postmortem on “Asana full outage for some users (2 hours, 25% outage)”. evidence confidence: high
- User reports are within normal range (0 in 15 min). evidence confidence: low
- Amazon Web Services reports an issue. Asana may depend on it (inferred from public sources). Coincidence, not causation. evidence confidence: low
What we don't know: what is happening inside Asana's own systems, how many users are actually affected (reports are self-selected and unverified), and anything from routing / bgp. Routing data shows reachability, not whether the app works.
Coincidence, not causation: signals that overlap in time are shown side by side, not as proof of cause.
Automated analysis by Cloudy_Day NetWeather; not a personal statement. Generated .
Cloudy_Day's take
Stage vs. health
The vendor's stage is “postmortem”. Stage tells you where they are in their process; health is what users experience. Right now vendor: operational · users: normal · routing: no data · upstream providers: major. Vendor status and outside signals roughly agree.
Who depends on whom
Asana may run on Amazon Web Services (inferred). We don't map other services that depend on Asana. Dependency chains are where single points of failure hide.
Identity & trust lens
Even without an identity system involved, outages push people toward workarounds: password resets, unofficial apps and “status” links in DMs. Each one is a trust decision. Use official channels.
For users
Check the official status page before changing settings or reinstalling. If you must act, use known-good bookmarks. Reporting what's broken on ORBIT helps everyone see the real footprint.
For security teams
Treat this as an availability event unless an official source says otherwise. Check which of your systems sit on Asana or its upstream providers, watch for outage-themed phishing aimed at your users, and log what you see with timestamps (all four clocks).
What to watch next
The vendor stage moving to “monitoring”, then “resolved”; the user-report curve falling back under baseline; and whether dependents start reporting issues.
Automated analysis by Cloudy_Day NetWeather; not a personal statement. Independent researcher; not affiliated with Asana. No blame or attack claims without an official source. Generated .
INCIDENT REPLAY
Asana full outage for some users (2 hours, 25% outage)
major postmortem · started · resolved
6 updates
- investigating
We are investigating alerts for slow performance and application errors.
- investigating
We are continuing to investigate the issue; we have reverted recent changes, and are working to identify the source of the errors.
- investigating
We have made configuration changes and see partial recovery, but we continue to see some elevated errors.
- monitoring
We've applied a fix are seeing signs of recovery.
- resolved
User-facing symptoms have recovered. We'll continue to monitor, and will prioritize a retrospective to understand and prevent similar incidents in the future.
- postmortem
We’ve been working to add a caching layer to our update pipeline, tuning it carefully and rolling it out gradually. On Wednesday, August 26 we enabled it for most use cases, and it initially performed well. On Monday, August 31, a combination of unrelated infrastructure changes and peak traffic pushed the cache past its scaling limits. Once that threshold was crossed, the cache became unusable, and many pods serving read traffic for the Asana application could no longer serve it. We mitigated the incident by reverting the system to use the previous, non-cached code path. The revert was successful, but recovery took longer than we would expect for this class of issue. A fuller analysis is underway. We will follow up with root causes, action items, and improvements, including why recovery took as long as it did. We were fully down for about 25% of our users, for 2 hours, 15 minutes.
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How to read this: official status comes from each provider's own public status page. User reports are unverified visitor reports. Things that happen at the same time are coincidence, not causation. Cloudy_Day is independent and not an official status source for any company listed.