CHYP.ai · ORBIT // Cloudy_Day Security Suite

Databases & data

Operational Aiven status

aiven.io · Official status page (Statuspage-compatible JSON)

FROM ALL SOURCES

Aiven looks fine itself, but Amazon Web Services, a provider it may run on (inferred), reports major outage. Watch for knock-on effects.

confidence: low Vendor: operational · users: normal · routing: no data · upstream providers: major.

Vendor status vs. reality: Vendor status and outside signals roughly agree
The four clocks
ClockStartedRunning
Vendor clock when the vendor's open incident started31 days
Crowd clock when user reports began rising above normalnot seenn/a
Network clock when routing anomaly data first flagged itnot seenn/a
ORBIT clock when our checker first recorded the changenot seenn/a

Evidence

  • Official page: Operational (“All Systems Operational”). evidence confidence: high
  • Vendor stage: resolved on “Google Cloud VPN incident affecting services”. evidence confidence: high
  • User reports are within normal range (0 in 15 min). evidence confidence: low
  • Amazon Web Services reports an issue. Aiven may depend on it (inferred from public sources). Coincidence, not causation. evidence confidence: low

What we don't know: what is happening inside Aiven's own systems, how many users are actually affected (reports are self-selected and unverified), and anything from routing / bgp. Routing data shows reachability, not whether the app works.

Coincidence, not causation: signals that overlap in time are shown side by side, not as proof of cause.

Automated analysis by Cloudy_Day NetWeather; not a personal statement. Generated .

Cloudy_Day's take

Stage vs. health

The vendor's stage is “resolved”. Stage tells you where they are in their process; health is what users experience. Right now vendor: operational · users: normal · routing: no data · upstream providers: major. Vendor status and outside signals roughly agree.

Who depends on whom

Aiven may run on Amazon Web Services, Google Cloud, Microsoft Azure (inferred). We don't map other services that depend on Aiven. Dependency chains are where single points of failure hide.

Identity & trust lens

Even without an identity system involved, outages push people toward workarounds: password resets, unofficial apps and “status” links in DMs. Each one is a trust decision. Use official channels.

For users

Check the official status page before changing settings or reinstalling. If you must act, use known-good bookmarks. Reporting what's broken on ORBIT helps everyone see the real footprint.

For security teams

Treat this as an availability event unless an official source says otherwise. Check which of your systems sit on Aiven or its upstream providers, watch for outage-themed phishing aimed at your users, and log what you see with timestamps (all four clocks).

What to watch next

The vendor stage moving to “monitoring”, then “resolved”; the user-report curve falling back under baseline; and whether dependents start reporting issues.

Automated analysis by Cloudy_Day NetWeather; not a personal statement. Independent researcher; not affiliated with Aiven. No blame or attack claims without an official source. Generated .

INCIDENT REPLAY

Google Cloud VPN incident affecting services

minor resolved · started · resolved

8 updates

  1. investigating

    We are investigating an ongoing Google Cloud VPN incident affecting the europe-west2 and africa-south1 regions. This is impacting network connectivity between nodes and may affect the availability and performance of clustered Aiven services in the affected regions. Our team is investigating the impact and monitoring affected services. We will provide further updates as more information becomes available.

  2. investigating

    We are investigating an ongoing Google Cloud networking incident. Google Cloud engineers have confirmed an issue with Virtual Private Cloud (VPC) networking affecting communication between virtual machines, including communication over internal IP addresses, IPv6, and other networking paths. ``` The incident is currently reported to affect the following regions: Africa: africa-south1 Europe: europe-central2, europe-north1, europe-north2, europe-southwest1, europe-west1, europe-west2, europe-west3, europe-west4, europe-west6, europe-west8, europe-west9, europe-west10, and europe-west12 ``` This issue is impacting network connectivity between nodes and may affect the availability and performance of clustered Aiven services in the affected regions. Our team is investigating the impact and monitoring affected services. We will provide further updates as more information becomes available.

  3. investigating

    The latest information identifies europe-west2 and the europe-west2-b zone as affected locations. The incident involves Virtual Private Cloud (VPC) networking issues that can disrupt communication between virtual machines. This may affect connectivity between nodes and the availability of clustered Aiven services in the affected location. Our team continues to investigate the impact on affected services and monitor their health. We will share further updates as more information becomes available.

  4. investigating

    The latest information identifies `europe-west2` and the `europe-west2-b` zone as affected locations. The incident involves Virtual Private Cloud (VPC) networking issues that are disrupting communication between virtual machines in the affected location, which is impacting the availability of clustered Aiven services — currently Aiven for Apache Kafka and Aiven for OpenSearch. We continue to monitor our services to identify any remaining impacted services and we are waiting for connectivity to be restored from Google side, and for the affected nodes to return. We will share further updates as more information becomes available.

  5. investigating

    We are continuing to respond to the Google Cloud incident affecting the europe-west2 region. The underlying Google Cloud issue — a power outage in the europe-west2-b zone has been mitigated by Google, and recovery of most workloads has been in progress since 15:10 EEST. Services running in the affected region may be unavailable or degraded while recovery is in progress. We are seeing the recovery of services and are prioritizing the recovery of existing workloads. Customers may not be able to yet create new workloads. We are actively recovering the affected services, including recycling affected Kafka nodes and working through the OpenSearch and PostgreSQL services that need additional steps. We are monitoring the situation closely and will continue until all affected services are healthy.

  6. monitoring

    All PG and Kafka services known to be affected by the Google Cloud incident in europe-west2 have been recovered. We are currently recovering and fixing known Opensearch services. We are continuing to monitor all services in the region to confirm they remain healthy. If you are still experiencing issues with a service in europe-west2, please contact Aiven Support.

  7. monitoring

    All Aiven services known to be affected by the Google Cloud incident in europe-west2 have been recovered. After Google mitigated the power outage in the europe-west2-b zone, we restored the affected Aiven for Apache Kafka, Aiven for OpenSearch and Aiven for PostgreSQL services by recovering nodes or replacing them. We are continuing to monitor all services in the region to confirm they remain healthy. If you are still experiencing issues with a service in europe-west2, please contact Aiven Support.

  8. resolved

    This incident has been resolved. A power outage in Google Cloud's europe-west2-b zone disrupted services running in the europe-west2 region. Nodes in the affected zone were rebooted when the zone recovered. Some affected Aiven for Apache Kafka, Aiven for OpenSearch, Aiven for PostgreSQL and Aiven for Valkey services needed extra recovery steps or node replacement before they returned to normal operation. All affected services have now been restored. We apologise for the disruption.

Official incident page ↗

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How to read this: official status comes from each provider's own public status page. User reports are unverified visitor reports. Things that happen at the same time are coincidence, not causation. Cloudy_Day is independent and not an official status source for any company listed.

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