What happened
Google Cloud: Service Control crash loop after a blank quota-policy field went global. Scope: Global.
CHYP.ai · ORBIT // Cloudy_Day Security Suite
OUTAGE DISSECTOR · CASE FILE · Meltdown Index · vendor post-incident report
Google Cloud: Service Control crash loop after a blank quota-policy field went global. Scope: Global.
Meltdown
Drag or press Play to replay what was public at each moment. Each dot links to its evidence. Lanes are kept separate on purpose.
Google Cloud: Service Control crash loop after a blank quota-policy field went global. Scope: Global.
Google Cloud APIs, Google Workspace, Google Security Operations, Cloud IAM / Service Control.
75 catalogued services run on Google Cloud (inferred). Hit: Global.
Resolved after 7h 27m.
Center: Google Cloud. Inner ring: what it runs on. Outer ring: catalogued services that run on it, coloured by their official status right now. Dependencies are inferred from public information.
Places come from names in the public text (cities, PoP codes, countries, regions). Approximate.
Failure modes as stated in the vendor's own post-incident report (Meltdown Index).
Correlation is not causation
Five independent lanes across the window. Brighter = stronger item. Items landing in the same column are coincidence unless the provider says otherwise.
On June 12, 2025 at ~10:45am PDT, a policy change was inserted into the regional Spanner tables that Service Control uses for policies. Given the global nature of quota management, this metadata was replicated globally within seconds. This policy data contained unintended blank fields. Service Control, then regionally exercised quota checks on policies in each regional datastore. This pulled in blank fields for this respective policy change and exercised the code path that hit the null pointer causing the binaries to go into a crash loop.
Official incident window: began 2025-06-12 10:51 and ended 2025-06-12 18:18 US/Pacific (7h 27m). The policy insertion is described at approximately 10:45am PDT.
Verbatim excerpt from Google Cloud Service Health — Service Control, 12 Jun 2025.
100% similar · same provider
Automated quota system shrank User ID Service capacity
CapacityConfig pushControl plane
85% similar · same provider
IAM configuration change propagated globally past canary
Config pushControl plane
75% similar · same provider
Network-control-plane configuration update dropped GCVE private traffic
Config pushControl plane
Nearest matches in the Control-Plane Meltdown Index (1.0.0, vendor-sourced, tracked since 2024 with earlier landmark cases). Similarity = provider + failure modes + scope.
Automated take: rules written by Cloudy_Day, applied to public data. Not a human verdict on this incident, not a root-cause finding, not affiliated with Google Cloud.
Everything above as one shareable, citable capsule with a content hash.
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