What happened
Amazon Web Services: Kinesis cell-management misidentified healthy hosts during a deployment. Scope: Regional (one Kinesis cell; other cells in the Region continued to operate).
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OUTAGE DISSECTOR · CASE FILE · Meltdown Index · vendor post-incident report
Amazon Web Services: Kinesis cell-management misidentified healthy hosts during a deployment. Scope: Regional (one Kinesis cell; other cells in the Region continued to operate).
Severe storm
Drag or press Play to replay what was public at each moment. Each dot links to its evidence. Lanes are kept separate on purpose.
Amazon Web Services: Kinesis cell-management misidentified healthy hosts during a deployment. Scope: Regional (one Kinesis cell; other cells in the Region continued to operate).
Amazon Kinesis Data Streams (internal cell), Amazon CloudWatch Logs, Amazon Data Firehose, Amazon S3 event framework and 4 more.
136 catalogued services run on Amazon Web Services (inferred). Hit: Regional (one Kinesis cell; other cells in the Region continued to operate).
Resolved after 6h 52m.
Center: Amazon Web Services. Inner ring: what it runs on. Outer ring: catalogued services that run on it, coloured by their official status right now. Dependencies are inferred from public information.
Places come from names in the public text (cities, PoP codes, countries, regions). Approximate.
Failure modes as stated in the vendor's own post-incident report (Meltdown Index).
Correlation is not causation
Five independent lanes across the window. Brighter = stronger item. Items landing in the same column are coincidence unless the provider says otherwise.
The Kinesis cell management system determined that the healthy hosts were unhealthy and began redistributing shards that those hosts had been processing to other hosts. This created a spike in the rate of shard redistribution across the impacted Kinesis cell and eventually overloaded another component that is used to provision secure connections for communication to Kinesis data plane subsystems, which in turn impaired Kinesis traffic processing.
Customer-visible window 2:45 PM–9:37 PM PDT. A routine deployment in a single AZ of a cell with a very large number of very low-throughput shards began at 9:09 AM PDT and triggered the cell-management failure.
Verbatim excerpt from Summary of the Amazon Kinesis Data Streams Service Event in Northern Virginia (US-EAST-1) Region.
77% similar · same provider
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Kinesis front-end fleet exceeded OS thread limit
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DynamoDB DNS automation wrote an empty record it could not repair
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Nearest matches in the Control-Plane Meltdown Index (1.0.0, vendor-sourced, tracked since 2024 with earlier landmark cases). Similarity = provider + failure modes + scope.
Automated take: rules written by Cloudy_Day, applied to public data. Not a human verdict on this incident, not a root-cause finding, not affiliated with Amazon Web Services.
Everything above as one shareable, citable capsule with a content hash.
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